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INHALT (‘CONTENT’) AS A TECHNICAL TERM IN 
MUSICAL SEMIOTICS
Inhalt (‘content’) is so common that it could hardly pass as a technical term. The purpose 
of this article is to show that from the 18th to the 20th century it was nevertheless used 
particularly to denote the specifically musical meaning arising from what music ‘contains’ 
of notes, rhythms, melodic cells, etc. Hegel, Marx, Hauptmann, Hanslick, Schenker, 
Schoenberg and probably others shared the same view that music has a content of its own, 
one that cannot be translated in verbal language.
The German term Inhalt (‘content’) is so common that it could hardly pass as a 
technical term. It originated from inne (Latin intus, ‘within’, ‘inside’), and halten 
(‘to hold’). It first appeared in the 15th century, perhaps as a law term, to denote 
the content (the argument, the summary – also Gehalt) of a text. It came only 
later to denote volume size, capacity.1 Applied to music, its usage obviously is 
metaphoric. In its most down-to-earth meaning, to which I will refer below as 
‘content strictly speaking’, it merely denotes what music may ‘contain’ of notes, 
rhythms, melodic cells, etc. But music is not a container: it does not ‘contain’ 
such elements, no more than language ‘contains’ phonemes. The metaphor is 
not particularly problematic, however, and it is easily understood. Inhalt can be 
taken also in a more abstract and more general but no less metaphoric sense, 
denoting what music may comprise – or express – of meanings of all sorts.
What I want to stress is that, throughout these general (and somewhat confused) 
usages, the term may have taken on a particular meaning reuniting both sides of 
the metaphor, to denote the musical meaning (in the more general sense) arising 
1	 	See	Grimm	(1854−1971),	s.v.	Inhalt,	Inne, Halten,	etc.
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from the musical content strictly speaking. Because it arises from the music it-
self, this meaning is intrinsic; it is neither based on references to the outer world, 
nor assigned from the outside.
The debate about the musical content originates in several writings by Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, even although instances of the term applied to music 
can be found earlier in the 18th century.2 Hegel himself, in somewhat ambiguous 
statements, made complex distinctions between quasi synonymous terms, In-
halt, Gehalt, Gegenstand, Stoff, etc.3 The dual meaning of Inhalt clearly appears 
in this quotation:
“Let us now consider, after the ways to conceive of the other arts, those in the 
form of which music, be it accompanying or independent from any determined 
text, may capture and express a particular meaning. I already said before that mu-
sic, among all arts, encloses in itself the highest possibility to free itself not only 
from any real text, but also from the expression of any determined content, and 
to satisfy itself with a self-contained process of combinations, variations, opposi-
tions and interpositions falling within the purely musical domain of the sounds. 
But the music then remains empty, meaningless, and cannot truly be counted as 
art, as it lacks a principal feature of all art, the spiritual content and expression.”4 
Hegel makes here several distinctions. First of all, he distinguishes between the 
possible existence of a ‘determined content’ – a content of the kind that could 
be determined by a text set to music – and ‘self-contained processes within the 








4  Fragen wir nun zweitens nach der von den übrigen Künsten unterschiedenen Auffassungsweise, in deren 
Form die Musik, sey sie begleitend oder von einem bestimmten Text unabhängig, einen besonderen Inhalt 
ergreifen und ausdrücken kann, so sagte ich bereits früher, daß die Musik unter allen Künsten die meiste 
Möglichkeit in sich schieße, sich nicht nur von jedem wirklichen Text, sondern auch von dem Ausdruck 
irgend eines bestimmten Inhalts zu befreien, um sich bloß in einem in sich abgeschlossenen Verlauf von 
Zusammenstellungen, Veränderungen, Gegensätzen und Vermittelungen zu befriedigen, welche innerhalb 
des rein musikalischen Bereichs der Töne fallen. Dann bleibt aber die Musik leer, bedeutungslos, und ist, da 
ihr die eine Hauptseite aller Kunst, der geistige Inhalt und Ausdruck abgeht, noch nicht eigentlich zur Kunst 
zu rechnen (Hegel	1838:	142−143).	What	Hegel	calls	“accompanying	music”	obviously	is	music	setting	a	text.
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tions, variations, oppositions and interpositions) in the sound domain. He fur-
ther distinguishes between these technical processes and the ‘spiritual content 
and expression’ that form the principal feature of all arts, and that must also be 
considered distinct from the ‘determined’ content. 
Mark Evan Bonds (2014: 88), among others, quotes this passage in support of 
the idea that instrumental music, for Hegel, is empty and meaningless and could 
hardly be considered to have risen to the level of art at all. This however fails to 
acknowledge the declared purpose of the passage, which is to show how – and 
not whether – music may express a particular meaning. It fails to take account 
of the distinction that Hegel makes between “determined content” (bestimmter 
Inhalt) and “spiritual content” (geistiger Inhalt). Hegel’s determined content is 
verbally determined: it belongs to verbal texts (literature, poetry, etc.) in general, 
and to music with text in our case. If no text determines the content, and if mu-
sic satisfies itself with purely technical processes, it may indeed remain empty 
and meaningless. But Hegel continues and stresses that instrumental music, in 
order to count as art, must express spirituality. Its content may then remain in-
determinate, but it nevertheless can be deduced from the harmonic and melodic 
situation:
“Only when spirituality is expressed in adequate manner in the sensual element 
of the sounds and their diverse figuration does music rise to [the level of] true 
art, regardless whether this content obtains for itself a more detailed description 
in words, or must be indeterminately perceived from the sounds, their harmonic 
relationships and their melodic animation.”5
Discussions about these continue throughout the 19th century and later. The term 
is soon discussed in connection with musical form, either to claim that music has 
no content, only form; or to demonstrate that the content of music is its form; or 
to oppose content and form in music. Adolf Bernhard Marx confirms Hegel’s 
statement that musical devices alone (sounds, vibrations, tones, noises, temporal 
events) cannot produce content if they lack spirituality. It is only through musi-
cal form, he adds, that musical spirituality (Geist) is able to produce its own 
5  Erst wenn sich im den sinnlichen Element der Töne und ihrer mannigfaltigen Figuration Geistiges in 
angemessener Weise ausdrückt, erhebt sich auch die Musik zur Wahren Kunst, gleichgültig, ob dieser Inhalt 
für sich seine nähere Bezeichnung ausdrücklich durch Worte erhalte, oder unbestimmter aus den Tönen und 
deren harmonischen Verhältnissen und melodische Beseelung müsse empfunden worden	(Hegel	1838:	143).
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musical content. And what Marx considers ‘musical form’ must be of the same 
nature as what Hegel had described as the harmonic relationships and the me-
lodic animation of the sounds. Marx writes:
“Form is not the opposite of content but its determination. Form’s opposite is not 
content in general but rather formlessness – content that is unformed and thus, in 
its formlessness, undetermined and totally indeterminable. Sounds, vibrations, 
tones, noises, temporal events: these are not music but for it merely the shapeless 
materials out of which the spirit shapes music. […] Form in music is thus noth-
ing other than the shaping and hence determination of content that is originally 
shapeless and undetermined but lies ready and awaiting in the spirit, and only 
then through shaping, through form becoming music. The spirit sets its musical 
content in the musical form, sets it firmly and, by so doing, comes in it to itself, 
its law, and its consciousness.”6 
Moritz Hauptmann was one of the major German music theorists of the 19th cen-
tury. His dialectic approach to music theory, based on ideas of unity, opposition 
and synthesis, has been at the origin of Hugo Riemann’s dual theory of tonal 
functions. Hauptmann does not evidence much interest for the content of music. 
He views musical content mainly as ‘content strictly speaking’. One of his state-
ments nevertheless deserves being singled out here, when he writes that 
“Much as discourse (Rede) does not consist in words combined together, but in 
words put asunder and united in the thought, so the musical expression, which 
consists in putting asunder successions and consonances of notes, becomes unit-
ed only in the content of the musical thought to be expressed; its isolated mo-
ments are but members of an organic unity.”7
6  [Form] ist nicht Gegensatz zum Inhalt, sondern dessen Bestimmung. Ihr Gegensatz ist nicht der 
Inhalt überhaupt, sondern die Formlosigkeit, – der nicht gestaltete, also nicht bestimmte und in seiner 
Formlosigkeit gar nicht bestimmbare Inhalt. Schalle, Klänge, Töne, Laute, zeitliche Momente – sind nicht 
Musik, sie sind für sie nur jener gestalltlose Stoff, aus dem der Geist Musik gestaltet. […] Die Form in 
der Musik ist also nichts Anderes, als Gestaltung und damit Bestimmung des Inhalts, der ursprünglich 
gestaltlos und unbestimmt, aber musikalischer Gestaltung gewärtig und begehren im Geiste gelegen, und 
nun erst – durch Gestaltung, durch die Form – Musik wird. In der musikalischen Form setzt der Geist seinen 
musikalischen Inhalt, setzt ihn fest, kommt in ihm zu sich und seinen Recht und Bewußtsein (Marx	1856	:25).	
See	Marx	1997:	60−61,	translation	slightly	modified.
7  Wie aber die Rede nicht in zusammengesetzten Worten, sondern in auseinander gesetzten besteht, die 
im Gedanken Eins sind, so ist auch der musikalische Ausdruck, der sich in Folge und Zusammenklang 
in Tönen auseinander setzt, nur Eins im Inhalte des auszusprechenden musikalischen Gedankens: seine 
Einzelmomente sind nur Glieder einer organischen Einheit	(Hauptmann	1853:	7).
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Hauptmann recognizes here that the musical content does not result from musi-
cal units put in succession, but from their organic unity in a discourse expressing 
a musical idea. This may be viewed merely as another way to state that form 
determines content, as already stressed by Adolf Bernhard Marx in the text 
quoted above. Form indeed is what organically unites the succession of isolated 
moments. But Hauptmann’s statement is interesting also because it anticipates 
on an idea that was developed only a century later in linguistic semiotics, that 
the meaning properly speaking “results from the succession, the appropriation 
to circumstance and the adaptation of the different signs to each other.”8
The discussion of musical content and form takes a more dramatic turn in 
Eduard Hanslick’s The Beautiful in Music. Hanslick opens the last chapter of his 
book, “The concepts of content and form in music”, with the question Hat die 
Musik einen Inhalt? ’Has music a content?’. This question is surprising, espe-
cially so late in the book, because musical content had been a concern of all the 
previous chapters. Hanslick asks the question rhetorically, as that which many of 
his readers may still have in mind despite what he wrote before. His last chapter 
is both a final attempt to convince and a final vindication of his argument. 
Hanslick’s object is ‘the musically beautiful’,9 a type of beauty that exists only 
in music. His aim is to describe the specific beauty of music itself, that which 
is conveyed by the music itself, independently of any external reference arising 
from the text set to music or of any other descriptive function, a beautiful that, 
independent and in no need of content coming from outside itself, resides only 
in the notes and in their artistic combination.10 
But this raises the question of the identification and description of the content 
of music:
8  La sémantique, c’est le « sens » résultant de l’enchainement, de l’appropriation à la circonstance et de 
l’adaptation des différents signes entre eux (Benveniste 1968: 21).
9	 	See	Payzant	1986:	95−96.
10 	(…)	ein Schönes, das unabhängig und unbedürftig eines von außen her kommenden Inhalts, einzig in 
den Tönen und ihrer künstlerischen Verbindung liegt	(Hanslick	1854:	32);	see	Hanslick	1986:	28,	translation	
modified.	Payzant	1986:	95−96	stresses	that	the	term	Ton	should	not	be	translated	as	‘sound’	because	Töne,	
for	Hanslick,	 are	 sounds	 of	 determined,	measurable	 pitch.	 “In	 this	 sense,	 a	 ‘tone’	 is	 a	 sound,	 actual	 or	
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“It is extraordinary difficult to describe this autonomous beauty, this specifi-
cally musical. Since music has no model in nature and expresses no conceptual 
content, it can be talked about only in dry technical definitions or with poetical 
fictions. Its realm is truly ‘not of this world’. All the fanciful portrayals, char-
acterizations, circumscriptions of a musical work are either figurative or falla-
cious. What in every other art is still description, is in music already metaphor. 
Music demands once and for all to be grasped as music and can be only from 
itself understood and in itself enjoyed. 
In no way is the ‘specifically musical’ to be understood as mere acoustical beau-
ty of as symmetry of proportion – it embraces both as ancillary – and still less 
can we talk of an ‘ear-titillating play of tones’ and other such images by which 
the lack of a spiritual inspiration tends to become emphasized. When we insist 
on musical beauty, we did not exclude the spiritual content (Gehalt); on the con-
trary we presupposed it.”11
Hanslick stresses here – almost a century before it was raised in linguistics – one 
of the major problems of semiotics, the question whether a semiotic system can 
be translated in another; or, to put it otherwise, whether all meaning must be 
expressible in words. The real difficulty, he says, is to acknowledge that music 
may have an Inhalt, a content, a meaning that would depend in no way on the 
outer world, that would remain ‘not of this world’. Such content could neither be 
of the order of the ‘subject’ (Gegenstand) of music, nor of its ‘matter’ (Stoff ).
“When one raises the question of the ‘content’ of music, one has in mind the 
idea of ‘subject’ (matter) which, as the idea, as the ideal, stands directly opposed 
to the notes as ‘material ingredients’. Music in fact has no content in this sense, 
11  Es ist von außerordentlicher Schwierigkeit, dies selbständige Schöne in der Tonkunst, dies specifisch 
Musikalische zu schildern. Da die Kunst kein Vorbild in der Natur besitzt und keinen begrifflichen Inhalt 
ausspricht, so läßt sich von ihr nur mit trocknen technischen Bestimmungen, oder mit poetischen Fictionen 
erzählen. Ihr Reich ist in der That „nicht von dieser Welt”. All‘ die phantasiereichen Schilderungen, 
Characteristiken, Umschreibungen eines Tonwerks sind bildlich oder irrig. Was bei jeder andern Kunst 
noch Beschreibung, ist bei der Tonkunst schon Metapher. Die Musik will nun einmal als Musik aufgefaßt 
sein, und kann nur aus sich selbst verstanden, in sich selbst genossen werden. 
Keineswegs ist das „Specifisch-Musikalische” als blos akustische Schönheit, oder proportionale 
Dimension zu verstehen, – Zweige, die es als untergeordnet in sich begreift, – noch weniger kann von 
einem „ohrenkitzelnden Spiel in Tönen” die Rede sein und ähnlichen Bezeichnungen, womit der Mangel an 
geistiger Beseelung hervorgehoben zu werden pflegt. Dadurch, daß wir auf musikalische	Schönheit dringen, 
haben wir den geistigen Gehalt nicht ausgeschlossen, sondern ihn vielmehr bedingt (Hanslick	1854:	34).	See	
Hanslick	1986:	30,	translation	slightly	modified.
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no matter in the sense of the subject treated. Quite rightly, Kahlert vigorously 
argues that no ‘verbal description’ can be provided for music as it can for paint-
ing (Kahlert 1846: 380), but his subsequent supposition is wrong [when he goes 
on to say] that such verbal descriptions might in some case afford ‘a remedy for 
a failing artistic pleasure’.”12
And Hanslick concludes by explaining how the musical content is in fact a spir-
itual substance. For this conclusion, he replaces Inhalt by Gehalt, not really op-
posing these terms, but using the second to stress the spirituality, the ideality of 
the content.
“From the fact that music has no content ([in the sense of] subject) it does not 
follow that music has no substance [Gehalt].
[…]
Regarding the accusation of contentlessness, music has content, but only musi-
cal content, which is not lesser spark of the divine flame than the beauty of any 
other art. But only by implacably denying any other ‘content’ (Inhalt) to music 
can one preserve its ‘substance’ (Gehalt). This is because no spiritual meaning 
can be determined from any undetermined feeling to which at best such content 
leads back; but well from the determined tonal structure as free creation of the 
mind from a material without concept, compatible with the mind.”13
Heinrich Schenker’s first important book, Der Geist der musikalischen Technik 
(Schenker 1895), mentions Inhalt on almost every page, but never in a very spe-
12  Bei der Frage nach dem „Inhalt” der Musik hat man die Vorstellung von „Gegenstand” (Stoff, Sujet) 
im Sinne, welchen man als die Idee, das Ideale den Tönen als „materiellen Bestandteilen” geradezu 
entgegensetzt. Einen Inhalt in dieser Bedeutung, einen Stoff im Sinne des behandelten Gegenstandes hat die 
Tonkunst in der That nicht. Kahlert stützt sich mit Recht nachdrücklich darauf, daß sich von der Musik nicht, 
wie vom Gemälde, eine „Wortbeschreibung” liefern läßt (Aesth. 380), wenngleich seine weitere Annahme 
irrig ist, daß solche Wortbeschreibung jemals eine „Abhülfe für den fehlenden Kunstgenuß” bieten kan 
(Hanslick	1854:	96).	See	Hanslick	1986:	78,	translation	modified.
13  Daraus, daß die Musik keinen Inhalt (Gegenstand) hat, folgt nicht, daß sie des Gehaltes entbehre. […] 
Gegenüber dem Vorwurf der Inhaltslosigkeit also hat die Musik Inhalt, allein musikalischen, welcher ein 
nicht geringer Funke des göttlichen Feuers ist, als das Schöne jeder andern Kunst. Nur dadurch aber, daß 
man jeden andern „Inhalt” der Tonkunst unerbittlich negiert, rettet man deren „Gehalt”. Denn aus dem 
unbestimmten Gefühle, worauf sich jener Inhalt im besten Fall zurückführt, ist ihr eine geistige Bedeutung 
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cific sense: the word, for him, is at that time merely a generic term. The title of 
the book deserves more attention. It easily translates as “The Spirit of the Musi-
cal Technique”, but ‘spirit’ (Geist) must obviously be understood with reference 
to the so many mentions of ‘spirituality’ and of ‘spiritual content’ since Hegel. A 
better translation might be “The Spirituality of the Musical Technique”. Schen-
ker’s intention was to show how the musical technique differentiated itself from 
that of verbal language – and, at the same time, from referentiality (Meeùs 2016). 
Schenker’s monograph on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony has the title Beethovens 
neunte Sinfonie. Eine Darstellung des musikalischen Inhaltes unter fortlaufend-
er Berücksichtigung auch des Vortrages und der Literatur, “Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony. A Presentation of the Musical Content under Ongoing Consideration 
of Both the Performance and the Literature”. According to Nicholas Cook, the 
basic purpose of the book “is to refute the whole edifice of Wagnerian interpre-
tation, and to reclaim the work for what Schenker calls ‘absolute music’” (Cook 
1993: 83). Schenker’s more precise purpose, as mentioned both in the title and 
throughout the book, is to describe the “musical content” of the symphony, a 
purely musical content that in no way depends on words or on a program, and 
that can be produced by purely musical technical means, without any external 
reference. The Inhalt of music has been a constant concern for Schenker during 
the forty years between his Geist der musikalischen Technik in 1895 and his 
posthumous Der freie Satz in 1935.14
Arnold Schoenberg wrote in 1912, the same year in which Schenker published 
his Beethoven monograph, an article that begins with these words:
“There are relatively few people able to understand in purely musical terms what 
music has to say.”15
The difficulty mentioned here is of the same nature as that about which Hanslick 
had written, that of describing the autonomous, specifically musical beauty of 
music.16 And one cannot refrain from thinking that the understanding in purely 
musical terms to which Schoenberg refers also is that of understanding what 
music means in purely musical terms, its truly musical meaning.
14 	For	more	information	about	Schenker’s	conception	of	the	Inhalt	of	music,	see	Meeùs	2017.
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Schoenberg later clarifies that the real musical content is what Hegel would have 
described as ‘indeterminate’, 17 and that understanding this type of content re-
sults in a better understanding of the music itself:
“I was deeply ashamed, a few years ago, when I discovered that I had no idea of 
what happened in the poems at the basis of some Schubert Lieder that I knew 
well. […] It appeared to me that, without knowing the poems, I had grasped the 
content, the real content, perhaps more deeply than if I had remained at the sur-
face of the particular thoughts expressed in words.”18
My purpose, in this paper, was mainly terminological. I tried to demonstrate 
that, from Carl Philip Emanuel Bach to Arnold Schoenberg, but probably also 
before and after, the German term Inhalt has been used among others to denote 
a specific musical content, a musical meaning expressed and understandable 
only in musical terms. But I don’t think that terminology can be an end in itself, 
at least in such a case. My underlying purpose concerns general semiotics. My 
conviction is that no truly general semiotics can be developed without admitting 
that semiotic systems other than verbal language can have a meaning of their 
own, utterly untranslatable in words. I hope to have shown that this also was the 
conviction of many a German aesthetician from the late 18th century to the 20th 
and probably later. 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s definition of the sign as a double entity associating 
signifier and signified (Saussure 1967: 98–99) had for a while limited the project 
of a general semiotics to systems derived from verbal language. Linguists soon 
realized that this mainly lexical conception of semiotics was not tenable. Ricœur 
(1975: 88–100), following Benveniste (see note 8 above), describes two linguis-
tics, one purely formal and the other referential. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1988: 
189–190) similarly describes a double conception of the musical signification, 
one that views musical meaning as “a play of forms and structures” and the 
other as “cultural symbol”. Raymond Monelle (1991; see also Monelle 1992) 
recognizes the possibility of a structural semantics of music. I myself pleaded 
17 	See	note	5.
18  Ich war von ein paar Jahren tief beschämt, als ich entdeckte, dass ich bei einigen mir wohlbekannten 
Schubert-Liedern gar keine Ahnung davon hatte, was in dem zugrundeliegenden Gedicht eigentlich 
vorgehe. […] es zeigte sich mir, dass ich, ohne das Gedicht zu kennen, den Inhalt, den wirklichen Inhalt, 
sogar vielleicht tiefer erfasst hatte, als wenn ich an der Oberfläche der eigentlichen Wortgedanken hafte 
geblieben wäre. 
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for an autonomous musical semiotics, independent from any external references 
and untranslatable in words (Meeùs 2009). But such considerations lead us away 
from terminology properly speaking and will have to be left for another occa-
sion.
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Inhalt (‘sadržaj’)  
kao tehnički termin u glazbenoj semiotici
Sažetak
Riječ Inhalt (‘sadržaj’) toliko je česta da bi se teško mogla smatrati tehničkim terminom. 
Svrha je ovoga rada pokazati da se bez obzira na svoju uvriježenost u razdoblju između 
18. i 20. stoljeća upotrebljavala za označivanje specifično glazbenoga značenja koje 
proizlazi iz toga što glazba „sadržava” u notama, ritmovima, melodijskim ćelijama itd. 
Hegel, Marx, Hauptmann, Hanslick, Schenker, Schoenberg i vjerojatno drugi dijelili su 
gledište da glazba ima vlastiti sadržaj koji se ne može prevesti u verbalni jezik.
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